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THE EFFECT OF A SUPERFUND SITE DESIGNATION ON
PROPERTY VALUES-SMUGGLER MOUNTAIN,
ASPEN, COLORADO: A CASE STUDY
NANCY A. MANGONE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Complaints from homeowners, small businesses and lenders about
the negative impacts of a Superfund site designation on their property
values are nothing new. For years, particularly after the passage of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986,1 citizens and
local and federal lenders have been lobbying the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA") to ease the "credit crunch" they
have been experiencing.
2
But just how pervasive is the credit crunch caused by Superfund
designation? While there are no national statistics compiled to answer
this question, examples from the six states comprising EPA's Region
V1113 suggest that the effects of a Superfund designation on property
values are anything but uniform. For example, in the prosperous com-
munities of Central City and Black Hawk in Colorado, taxes have been
raised to reflect the fourfold increase in property values inspired by be-
ing two of the few areas within the state approved for limited stakes
gambling. While local resident Norm Blake fears he cannot sell his
property because it is located within the Superfund site, he is quick to
admit that its value has increased from $5,000 to $5 million with the
introduction of gambling to his community.4 For most developers in
these two mountain communities, addressing Superfund wastes is sim-
ply a "cost of doing business" figured into their casino or parking lot
construction projects. No diminution of property values appears to
have resulted.
The community of Midvale, Utah, however, has been hard hit by its
Superfund designation. This community, located approximately twelve
miles to the east of Salt Lake City, is home to two contiguous Superfund
sites-the Sharon Steel (Tailings) and Midvale Slag Superfund sites.
Property values have been so affected by the sites' designations as "na-
* Senior Attorney, Office of Regional Counsel, United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, Region VIII. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the
author. Nothing contained in this Article, therefore, should be relied upon as a final
Agency decision or statement of position.
1. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C §§ 9601-
9675 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
2. See, e.g., Statement of Glenn L. Unterberger before the Senate Committee on
Small Businesses, August 3, 1989, as reported in 135 Cong. Rec. D. 923.
3. EPA's Region VIII is comprised of the States of Colorado, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Wyoming, Montana, and Utah.
4. See Changes Noted By Residents, Wkly. Reg. Call, Oct. 2, 1992, at 12.
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tional priorities" that the Salt Lake County Assessor stepped in to en-
sure that the owners of the approximately 511 residential properties
located within the sites retained some economic value for their homes.
5
The County, during its yearly tax assessment, significantly reduced the
value of approximately 95% of the homes within the sites. 6 For some of
these homes, the value for the land was fixed at $100 per lot, with the
remaining original value being assigned to the structure located on the
lot.7 For others, the value of land was fixed at $100, with the value of
the house staying the same.8 Only 5% of the properties retainedtheir
original values. While it is too early to tell if this solution will ease the
credit crunch long-term for the Midvale residents, the County's reas-
sessment program may have made it more difficult for some site resi-
dents to refinance their homes and may have decreased the City of
Midvale's revenue base between $35,000 and $50,000.9 This tax base
decrease may have a measurable impact on the City's ability to provide
essential public services.10
To understand the credit crunch and the responses of communities
in its grips, it is important to understand the actual as well as perceived
financial risks the lending community associates with a Superfund
designation. Nowhere in EPA's Region VIII is there a better example of
the credit crunch problem and its effects on a community than the
Smuggler Mountain Superfund Site located in Aspen, Colorado. It is
common knowledge that since the 1940's this once sleepy little mining
town has become the playground of the rich and famous. Property val-
ues have grown at an astronomical rate, with prime "downtown" build-
ing lots now going for $800,000 to $2 million.l" The Aspen boom has
forced many long time Aspen residents to flee, as they are no longer
able to afford the high costs of living and housing in Aspen. One chal-
lenge facing local governments, therefore, has been to secure reason-
ably priced housing for its "working" class. These affordable housing
units, however, are now located in the middle of one of the most contro-
versial Superfund sites in the country. Thus, the Superfund designation
has greatly impacted the economic balance of Aspen and makes an inter-
esting case study to frame the issues and solutions to this set of environ-
mental' 2 and financial problems.
5. Telephone Interview with Skip Criner, Director of Development Services for the
City of Midvale, Utah (Jan. 14, 1993); Telephone Interview with Bruce Nieveen, Environ-






11. Telephone Interview with Caroline Christensen, Agent, The Aspen Brokers, Ltd.
(Dec. 3, 1992).
12. "Environmental" is used generically in this article to denote risks to the health,
welfare and habitats of both human and ecological populations.
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II. SMUGGLER MOUNTAIN SUPERFUND SITE
BACKGROUND
The Smuggler Mountain Superfund Site ("Site") covers approxi-
mately 110 acres of land in the City of Aspen, Pitkin County, Colorado.
Its general boundaries consist of the Roaring Fork River on the west and
south, Hunter Creek on the north and Smuggler Mountain on the east.
Mining activities, including milling and processing operations, were be-
gun in the late 1800's, and it is estimated that heavy metal-laden wastes
were discarded and/or concentrated on the Site from the 1880's to
1960's.
1 3
The first mineral discovery in Aspen was made in 1879 on Aspen
Mountain and the first shipments of silver ores were sent by burro in the
early 1880's to the smelters operating in Leadville.14 The Denver & Rio
Grande Western completed a narrow gauge railroad between Aspen and
Glenwood Springs in 1887, and the Colorado Midland Railroad com-
pleted a direct route to the Leadville smelters through the Carlton Tun-
nel in 1888.15 Small local smelters and various mills operated until
these railroad connections were completed, but the processes employed
by these smelters and mills proved unsuccessful in separating zinc and
lead from the silver contained in the ores.
16
Statistics from the United States Bureau of Mines ("BOM") show
that the ores produced from the Aspen mining district returned roughly
$103 million, $74 million of which was in silver production and $27 mil-
lion in lead.17 The Smuggler Mountain mines produced approximately
one-half of this total value. 18 The Mollie Gibson Mine, located on
Smuggler Mountain, became famous in 1894 as the producer of the
largest silver nugget ever mined, weighing approximately 3,700 pounds.
The principal production from the Smuggler mines occurred between
1885 and 1895.19 The chain of producing mines during this boom pe-
riod was eventually consolidated into two groups of operations: those
held by the Smuggler-Durant Mining Company and those held by the
Della S. Consolidated Mines Company. 2° The Smuggler Leasing Com-
pany operated both the Smuggler and Della S. mines, but a dispute with
the owners of the Della S. Consolidated Mining Company, along with
the collapse of the silver market, resulted in a cessation of operations in
1918.21
13. Volin, M. E. and Dunham, W.C., United States Department of the Interior, Report




16. Id. at 5.
17. Volin, M.E. and Hild,J.H., Investigation of Smuggler Lead-Zinc Mine, Aspen, Pit-
kin County, Colorado. United States Department of the Interior Bureau of Mines Report
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Since 1918, there have been a number of attempts to re-start opera-
tions at the Smuggler mines. The three most noteworthy were: 1) at-
tempts by the BOM in the middle and late 1940's, first in conjunction
with the Pacific Bridge Company of San Francisco, and later the Hum-
phreys Gold Corporation of Denver; 2) attempts by the Anaconda Cop-
per Mining Company, with its affiliate the Aspen Mining Company, in
1948 and 1949; and 3) an attempt by the McCulloch Oil Company of
California to mill the dump materials adjacent to the Smuggler mines in
the mid to late 1960's.2 2 The Herron Brothers, owners of the gravity-
separation mill located on the Site, also intermittently mined and milled
ores during and after World War 11.23
The geologic nature of the Smuggler Mines is characterized as sil-
ver-bearing, lead-zinc deposits formed mainly by the replacement of
limestones and dolomites.2 4 These ores exist in the contact between
two stages of mineralized breccia, 25 known as the Leadville and Weber
formations. Mining was conducted by crosscutting the contact fault of
these formations and by stoping, to expose low-grade ores in the walls
of the stopes.2 6 The high concentrations of lead and cadmium caused
by these mining activities are found in the tailings and soils throughout
the Site. These hazardous substances in turn may pose toxic and carci-
nogenic health risks to the over 1,100 residents living within the Site's
boundaries. In 1981, a graduate student conducting his thesis docu-
mented high levels of lead in flowers and vegetables grown in gardens
on the Site.2 7 Investigations to determine the extent of contamination
on the media affected (air, surface water and groundwater) were begun
by EPA as early as June 1982.28 In 1983, at the request of the Board of
County Commissioners of Pitkin County, EPA became fully involved at
the Site.
2 9
Some of the potentially responsible parties, including the develop-
ers of the condominium complexes and trailer parks, agreed to conduct
a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study ("RI/FS").a0 The parties
22. Id.
23. Harshman, E. H. and Salsbury, M. E., United States Department of the Interior,
Defense Minerals Exploration Administration, DMPA Report 2296, Smuggler Mine, Pitkin
County, Colorado (June 1952), Engineering Report, at 3.
24. Id.
25. "Breccia" is a geologic term meaning a rock consisting of sharp fragments embed-
ded in a fine-grained matrix.
26. A "stope" is a step like underground excavation cut made for the removal of ore,
which is formed as the ore is mined in successive layers.
27. See Boon, D. Y., Lead Contamination in Aspen: A Preliminary Presentation, Fort
Collins, Colorado, Colorado State University Department of Agronomy (June 7, 1982).
28. See Record of Decision, Smuggler Mountain Superfund Site, Pitkin County, Colo-
rado, U.S. EPA Region VIII (September 1986) at 5.
29. See Resolution of the Board of County Commissioners of Pitkin County, Colorado,
Regarding Inclusion of the Smuggler Mountain Area on the Superfund National Priority
[sic] List, No. 84-124 (Dec. 10, 1984).; See also Letter from George Madsen, Chairman,
Board of County Commissioners, Pitkin County, Colorado to John Wardell, Air and Waste
Management Division, U.S. EPA Region VIII (March 14, 1983) (On file with EPA Region
VIII).
30. In an Administrative Order on Consent issued by EPA on July 12, 1985.
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submitted a final report on these investigations in March 1986.31 In an
exercise of its oversight role and as a follow-up to the RI/FS, EPA pre-
pared an Endangerment Assessment in May 1986 and an addendum to
the RI/FS in June 1986.32 The Regional Administrator subsequently
signed an Endangerment Finding, which determined that the levels of
cadmium and lead in the soils at the Site pose "an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to public health and the environment."1
3 3
The Smuggler Mountain Site was originally proposed for inclusion
on the National Priorities List ("NPL") in 1984.3 4 After taking public
comment on this proposed listing, the Site was finally listed on the NPL
on June 10, 1986.3 5 A Record of Decision ("ROD") was issued on Sep-
tember 26th of that same year, also at the conclusion of a public com-
ment period.3 6 The ROD separated the Site into two operable units.
3 7
The remedy selected for Operable Unit 1 called for excavation to a
depth of four feet and disposal of "high-level wastes" soil (i.e., over
5,000 parts per million ("ppm") of lead) in a Pitkin County owned and
operated repository.3 8 This repository would be capped, meeting the
performance standards for in-place closure found in the Resource Con-
servation and Reclamation Act ("RCRA"). 39 Compliance with local
land use restrictions and controls, known as "institutional controls,"
would be required in perpetuity and would be ensured by the County.
40
"Low-level wastes" (i.e., between 1,000 and 5,000 ppm lead) would be
controlled by placing a six to twelve inch cap of clean topsoil over the
wastes and revegetating. 4 1 The County would also be required to con-
duct groundwater monitoring on a quarterly basis.
4 2
Sampling to determine the amount of soil with high-level wastes be-
gan in the Spring of 1988. 4 3 Repository sites were also identified and a
suitable location, the Mollie Gibson Park, was selected because of its
stability and its size.4 4 When continued sampling showed that the
amount of soil needing excavation and disposal was greater than origi-
nally estimated, EPA issued an Explanation of Significant Differences
("ESD"), which amended several elements of the ROD. 4 5 The March 2,
1989, ESD changed the remedy by allowing for shallower excavation (to
31. See Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study for the Smuggler Mountain Super-
fund Site, Aspen, Pitkin County, Colorado, U.S. EPA Region VIII (March 1986).
32. See Endangerment Assessment for the Smuggler Mountain Site, Pitkin County,
Colorado, Draft Final Report, U.S. EPA Region VIII (May 5, 1986).
33. Id.
34. 49 Fed. Reg. 40321 (October 15, 1984).
35. 51 Fed. Reg. 21073 (June 10, 1986).
36. See Record of Decision, supra note 28.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1988). In-place closure standards are found in § 6925.
40. See Record of Decision, supra note 28.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Soil Cleanup of Smuggler Mountain Site, Explanation of Significant Differ-
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two feet) and replacement of high-level wastes soils, but established a
more stringent action level. 46 All soils with lead concentrations above
1,000 ppm were to be addressed.4 7 As a result of the increase in the
volume of soils to be excavated, EPA deemed that additional repository
space was necessary. 4 8 That space was to be located on property owned
by the Smuggler Racquet Club.
4 9
Several elements of the remedy proposed in the ESD were altered
in a second ESD dated May 16, 1990.50 These changes consisted of a
greater reliance on institutional controls and excavation or placement of
only six inches of contaminated soils in the Hunter Creek and Centen-
nial condominium areas. 5 1 However, the remedy remained essentially
the same-where lead concentration of the soil exceeded the action
level, soil would be excavated to a depth of one foot, a geotextile barrier
would be installed, and "clean" soils would be placed over the
geotextile.
5 2
In May of 1991, the Board of County Commissioners adopted the
requisite institutional controls as a prelude to EPA's implementation of
the remedy contained in the 1990 ESD. 53 Three weeks later, however,
in the face of a citizens' referendum to block its implementation, the
County repealed the new land use ordinance.54 In July, 1991, citing the
same citizen opposition, the City Council tabled consideration of an
identical land use and building code ordinance. 5 5 The citizens' coali-
tion-the Smuggler Mountain Citizens' Caucus-and local governmen-
tal officials then lobbied Congressional and Agency officials to either re-
examine the need for the remedy or delete the Site from the NPL.
56
These efforts culminated in a meeting between Aspen representa-
tives, EPA senior level management officials and Colorado's Congres-
sional delegation in Washington, D.C., on February 28, 1992. 5 7 This
meeting resulted in a commitment by EPA to impanel an advisory com-
mittee of technical experts to examine risk assessment information gen-




49. See Soil Cleanup of Smuggler Mountain Site, Aspen, Pitkin County, Colorado,





53. See Michael Bourne, New Smuggler Vote-Approval Needed Again, ASPEN DAILY NEWS,
July 4, 1991, at 1, 16.
54. Id.; See also Scott Condon, EPA Foes Will Declare Independence In Parade, ASPEN TIMES
DAILY, July 4, 1991, at 1.
55. See Letter from Edward M. Caswall, City Attorney, City of Aspen, to Marc R. Al-
ston, Chief, Colorado Section, U.S. EPA Region VIII, Superfund Remedial Branch (Au-
gust 20, 1991); See also Michael Bourne, Council, EPA Debate Big Question; Final Vote Delayed
For Two Weeks, ASPEN DAILY NEWS, June 25, 1991, at 3.
56. See Michael Bourne, U.S. Senators Push for Smuggler Exclusions, Fannie Mae Help,




coalition. 58 The task of the panel was to advise the Agency and the com-
munity on whether a risk is posed by the hazardous substances found at
the Site.59 This Technical Advisory Committee ("TAC"), in a prelimi-
nary report issued October 27, 1992, determined that while no actual,
current risk exists from the hazardous substances found at the. Site, a
small future risk may exist. 60 These findings assumed that the observed
land use and human behavioral patterns would not change signifi-
cantly. 6 1 Going beyond its charge, the TAC suggested measures to ad-
dress or manage the risks presented by these materials. 6 2 A final TAC
report was issued on January 27, 1993,63 and EPA responded by ac-
cepting the TAC's recommendations. 64
In the meantime, on October 16, 1989, the United States filed a cost
recovery suit seeking $1,851,116.58 in past costs pursuant to Section
107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 6 5 The United States' complaint sought to
recover response costs from eleven named defendants. 66 These defend-
ants, in addition to the developers mentioned previously, included a
number of owners and operators of property within the Site, such as the
Hunter Creek Commons Corporation and the Smuggler Racquet Club.
The assertion of cost recovery claims against these two parties, one a
homeowners' association and the other a loose association of tennis-
playing Aspenites, gave the residents of the Site considerable cause for
concern. And although not named in the lawsuit, the citizens living
within the site were technically liable as current owners of a facility ac-
cording to Section 107 of CERCLA.
FINANCIAL IMPACTS
The residents of the Smuggler Mountain Site first began to claim
that they were experiencing difficulty in selling their properties some
time after EPA finally listed the Site on the NPL and selected its remedy
in 1986.67 Since that time, residents have continued to maintain that it
is both difficult to secure financing for selling or improving property
within the Site and that the value of the property has significantly de-
58. Id.
59. Smuggler Mountain Technical Advisory Comm., U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency,
Executive Summary 3 (Oct. 28, 1992).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 3-4.
63. Smuggler Mountain Technical Advisory Comm. Final Report, U.S. Envtl. Protec-
tion Agency (Jan. 27, 1993).
64. See Bryan Abas, EPA Accepts Panel's Smuggler Recommendations, ASPEN DAILY NEWS,
Jan. 6, 1993, at 8.
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Section 107 of CERCLA ad-
dresses potential liability of polluters for cleanup costs. Id. § 9607. In the intervening
three years, the United States' costs, including investigatory, remedial design and litiga-
tion-related costs and interest have escalated to over $7 million.
66. As of the date of writing this article, the United States has reached either settle-
ments with seven of the eleven original parties, and dismissed with prejudice against an-
other defendant.
67. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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creased. In an attempt to ascertain whether these difficulties indeed ex-
ist and if so, the nature and extent of the financial problems the
residents are facing, this author consulted a number of the local lenders
and examined the correspondence between EPA and the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae").
68
PROPERTY VALUES
It is difficult to ascertain the effect of the Superfund site designa-
tion-both prior to and following NPL listing--on property values of
parcels within the Smuggler Mountain area for a variety of reasons.
Property values are generally attained by examining comparable proper-
ties as "paired sales" and adjusting the value of the property being
purchased or appraised up or down based on a number of variables.
6 9
These variables may include the condition of the home, trailer or condo-
minium unit, any improvements that are unique to the property, and any
land use restrictions that may apply to the property, such as condomin-
ium bylaws or zoning ordinances. 70 The difficulty in valuing the Smug-
gler properties arises from the fact that there are few properties that are
comparable. 7 1 Also, there is no specific formula for increasing or de-
creasing the value of a property based on the Superfund designation;
the value of properties within the Site is determined by local real estate
appraisers on a property-specific basis, using their best professional
judgment.
7 2
Perhaps the most important factor that an appraiser considers in
valuing a Smuggler property is whether the unit is "free market" or
"deed restricted."7 3 Deed restricted units are generally less valuable
because the pool of acceptable buyers is limited by local ordinance. 74 A
considerable number of the properties located within the Site were con-
structed between 1979 and 1985 with the restriction that they be rented
or sold to low, moderate or middle income families. 7 5 According to the
Aspen/Pitkin County Housing Authority 1992 Affordable Housing Guidelines, the
maximum gross household income for a person wishing to purchase or
rent a restricted unit has been divided into four categories. 76 Depend-
ing on the number of dependents in the household and the category, the
68. The author would like to thank representatives of Thatcher Bank, Colorado Fed-
eral Bank, Aspen Appraisal Group, Reitz Mortgage Association, the Aspen Board of Real-
tors and the Aspen/Pitkin Housing Authority for their invaluable assistance in preparing
this portion of the article.




72. Id. and Telephone Interview with Jodi Cooper, Colorado Federal Savings Bank
(Nov. 24, 1992).
73. Telephone Interview with Kathy Chappell, Senior Vice President, Thatcher Bank
(Nov. 24, 1992).
74. Id.
75. See Christensen, supra note 11.




income of the household can range from $22,000 to $100,000. Cate-
gory 1 sets an income level between $22,000 and $42,000 and is desig-
nated as the "low" income level. Category 2, with income levels from
$35,000 to $55,000, is the "lower moderate" income level. Category 3
(from $50,000 to $70,000) is the "upper moderate" income level and
Category 4 (from $85,000 to $100,000) is the "middle" income level. 77
The Hunter Creek, Centennial and Smuggler Run Mobile Home Park
units can by purchased or rented by persons or households that qualify
at or below Category 4 income levels. 78 These income restrictions were
imposed so that affordable housing could be made available to Aspen's
resident employee population.
There are four areas within the Site that are subject to income level
or "employee-occupied" deed restrictions. The Hunter Creek condo-
minium complex contains 295 units, 77 of which are deed restricted to
moderate and middle income families. 79 The Centennial condominium
complex contains 240 units which are all deed restricted: 148 units may
only be rented to low, moderate or middle income households; 92 units
may be sold to middle income qualifying buyers. 80 Smuggler Run Mo-
bile Home Park has 17 employee occupied restricted units. 8 ' Each of
these restricted units carries with it a ceiling of 6% appreciation of the
purchase price per annum so that the price will remain affordable. The
Smuggler Mobile Home Park consists of 87 units, which, while not "in-
come" restricted, are restricted by "owner occupancy" requirements.
The difference in property value between deed restricted and free mar-
ket units may be as much as $100,000.82
Although there is not a profusion of information about free market
units, there are two comparisons that can be made regarding the prop-
erty value and salability of certain Smuggler properties, particularly
those in the Hunter Creek condominium complex. In 1984, before the
Site was listed on the NPL, income restricted two bedroom, two bath-
room units in Hunter Creek were selling in the middle $50,000s to mid-
dle $60,000s range.8 3 Similarly sized condominium units in the
adjacent Lone Pine complex, which is just outside the Superfund site
boundary, were selling for approximately $10,000 more. 8 4 Today, a two
bedroom, two bathroom unit in Hunter Creek sells for approximately
77. Id.
78. Id. With no dependents, the maximum household income cannot exceed $85,000;
with three or more dependents, the maximum allowable income cannot exceed $100,000.
Id.
79. Memorandum from Terri Newland to Mark Fuller, Development Director, Pitkin




82. Comparable Hunter Creek 840 square foot, 2 bedroom units have sold for
$95,000 with the deed restrictions and $170,000 on the open market. See Aspen Bd. of
Realtors Summary Statistics (1992); Aspen/Pitkin County Housing Auth. Sales Activity
Summary (1992).
83. Aspen/Pitkin County Housing Auth. Sales Activity Summary (1984).
84. d.
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$95,000, while similar Lone Pine units sell for approximately
$100,000.85 Of course, the asking price for these units is controlled,.
since the seller can only receive a profit of 6% per annum. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the compared purchase prices have remained
constant; the deed restricted Hunter Creek units within the Site are
keeping pace with the property values of the deed restricted Lone Pine
units. These statistics demonstrate that the high demand for "low cost"
employee housing within Aspen still drives prices upward, regardless of
its location.
The second comparison that can be drawn is between the sales
figures for properties within the Site pre- and post-listing on the NPL.
According to EPA collected statistics, 153 of the Hunter Creek units
sold afterJune 10, 1986, the date of EPA's final listing of the Site on the
NPL.8 6 These 153 units reflect 51 % of all units within the Hunter Creek
complex.8 7 Likewise, 54% of the Centennial units were sold after NPL
listing.8 8 Ninety-four percent of the Smuggler Mobile Home Park
homes sold after June, 1986, as well as 50% and 57% of the single fam-
ily homes in the Sunny Park North and Hughes/Gibson subdivisions.8 9
Thus, the designation of the Site as a "priority" for EPA appears to have
had little if any effect on the initial sales of these condominium and
trailer park units or the resale of private residences.
There are also very few documented cases where the property val-
ues of land or private, single family homes within the Site have actually
decreased. One such devaluation occurred at the request of the owner
of the Smuggler Mine and Williams Ranch property-the Smuggler-Du-
rant Mining Corporation.90 Before 1986, this approximately fourteen
acre tract was valued at $350,000 for corporate asset and tax assessment
purposes. In 1987, the Corporation petitioned the County to decrease
the property's value to $65,000. The County agreed.9 1 This devalua-
tion has allowed the Corporation to pay less in real property taxes. It
has not, however, prevented the Corporation from soliciting offers from
interested buyers.9 2 Thus, with the exception of the Smuggler-Durant
property (which, it could be argued, is a significantly different situation),
property values within the Site seem to have increased apace with the
"downtown" area of Aspen, despite the Superfund designation.
85. Aspen/Pitkin County Housing Auth. Sales Activity Summaries (1991 & 1992).
86. Letter and enclosures from Sandra K. McDonald, Work Assignment Manager,
TechLaw Inc., to Paula Scl'mittdiel, USEPA Region VIII 3 (Nov. 2, 1990)(on file with
USEPA Region VIII). This letter discusses the number and percentage of landowners that




90. See Letter from Martin H. Kahn, Attorney for the Smuggler-Durant Mining Corp.,
to Pitkin County Assessor (June 23, 1987) (requesting adjusting value of Williams Ranch)
(on file with USEPA Region VIII).
91. See Pitkin County Assessor, Residential Property Appraisal Record, Schedule No.
08-04445, Parcel No. 2737-074-00-008 (1987).
92. See Scott Condon, Housing Longtime Locals, Not Profit, Is Goal, Williams Ranch Group
Says, ASPEN TIMES DAILY, Feb. 3, 1992, at 13.
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After ascertaining whether the property is deed restricted, apprais-
ers may contact EPA to determine whether the property requires
remediation or has "tested out" (i.e., has a soil lead level less than 1,000
ppm). 93 Appraisers do not go so far, however, as to assign a dollar
value to the cost of remediating the property.9 4 Previous EPA mine
waste residential soil cleanups, like the one in East Helena, Montana,
have cost approximately $15,000 to $20,000 per property.95 While the
size of the residential yards in the East Helena cleanup were larger, the
cost is thought to be an applicable estimate since the Smuggler cleanup
requires more remediation by hand rather than by earthmoving equip-
ment. Generally, the appraisers do not devalue the property by this
$15,000 amount, but merely note that the property is within the Site
boundaries and that it may contain contaminated soil. The Superfund
Site designation, even though it is widely known within the Aspen com-
munity, must specifically be disclosed by the appraiser, since local banks
and Fannie Mae require a disclosure of environmental hazards. 96
LENDING PRACTICES
In addition to the appraised value of the property, the other major
factor that influences "salability" is the willingness of lenders to finance
or purchase loans.9 7 Private and public lenders have been unwilling to
initiate or purchase loans on the secondary mortgage market for Smug-
gler properties because of two potential liabilities: (1) the liability the
current residential owner may have to the United States for its response
costs; and (2) the liability the lender may acquire if it forecloses on a
loan and takes title to the property in the future. The banks and public
lenders were also concerned that they may not be able to dispose of the
property and recoup their investment in a future sale.
98
By law, the current owner of a "facility" where hazardous sub-
stances have been disposed of, placed or come to be located 9 9 is liable
to reimburse the United States for the costs incurred in responding to
these hazards to human health or the environment.1 0 0 The United
States can recover costs of any response activity, including costs in-
curred for investigatory, abatement or enforcement purposes.' 0 ' Resi-
dential owners were also concerned that, even though the portions of
the Site owned by them were distinct and insignificant in comparison to
93. See e.g. Letter from BrianJ. Pinkowski, Remedial Project Manager, U.S. EPA to L.J.
Erspamer (April 2, 1992) (regarding property "testing-out" because soil sampling results
were below EPA's 1,000 ppm action level).
94. See Vorbert, supra note 69.
95. Telephone Interview with Jay Spickelmier, Assistant to Vice President for Opera-
tions, ASARCO, Inc. (April 23, 1993).
96. Fannie Mae, Property and Appraisal Analysis 728 (1990).
97. Telephone Interview with Patrick R. Dalrymple, President, Colorado Federal Sav-
ings Bank (Nov. 24, 1992).
98. Id.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B).
100. Section 107(a)(l) of CERCLA holds persons liable that are owners or operators of
a facility. Id. § 9607(a)(1).
101. Id. § 9604.
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the rest of the Site, they would be held jointly and severally liable' 0 2 for
all response costs incurred and to be incurred at the Site. Further, these
owners could not sustain a defense as "innocent" or de minimis landown-
ers, since the owners bought the properties with the knowledge that
they were within the location of historic mining activities.10 3 With close
to $7 million in past costs spent, and the remedial costs projected at $10
to $12 million, the potential Superfund liability would spell bankruptcy
and financial ruin for any homeowner compelled to pay a substantial
portion of these costs. Public lenders like Fannie Mae and private lend-
ers like the local and regional banks shared these concerns: the lenders
were worried that taking title to these residential properties would sub-
ject them to joint and several liability for environmental hazards they
neither created nor exacerbated.
While EPA maintained that it would not look to individual landown-
ers or lenders who took title to Smuggler properties pursuant to foreclo-
sure, lenders demanded more express assurances. 1o4 The banks argued
that without these assurances they could neither risk incurring
Superfund liability nor accept "tainted" property as collateral. Accord-
ing to the former President of the now defunct Aspen Savings Bank, no
amount of points or additional fees could make a bad loan good. 1o5 The
risk associated with these properties could not be measured and most
banks simply would not assume the risk. 106 Moreover, the perception of
the risk by the lending community was compounded by the community's
belief that the liabilities could outweigh the value of the Smuggler
properties.°7 The lendees, according to the bankers, therefore had lit-
tle or no incentive to repay the mortgage loan. 108
These perceptions translated into a suspension of conventional
102. Section 107(a) of CERCLA lists the classes of persons that may be held liable to
the United States for response costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Courts have upheld joint and
several liability under this provision where there are multiple defendants and the harm is
not divisible. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 223 (W.D.
Mo. 1985); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1395-96, 1401 (D.N.H.
1985).
103. In order to sustain such a defense, a landowner must be able to prove he con-
ducted "all appropriate inquiry" into the former ownership and use of the property
purchased. This inquiry must be made consistent with "good commercial practices" of the
real estate industry at the time the property is purchased. For a further discussion of the
requisite showing, see, "Guidance on Landowner Liability under Section 107(a)(1) of CER-
CLA, De Minimis Settlements under Section 122(g)(l)(B) of CERCLA, and Settlements
with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property," June 6, 1989.
104. Nationally, lenders were skittish about being held liable for conducting any loan
"work-out" activities on Superfund sites or foreclosing on mortgages and taking title to
Superfund properties because of two district court decisions: United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988)(holding issue of fact existed as to whether lender's
activities constituted control and thus justified imposition of liability) and United States v.
Maryland BanA & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (holding bank which owned
property and had previously been mortgagee liable for cleanup cost).






lending practices lasting some two years.' 0 9 Thatcher Bank, and before
its demise, Aspen Savings, were two of the few, if not the only banks,
that offered to approve mortgages on Smuggler properties between
April, 1990, and August, 1992.110 Conventional mortgage loans, such
as 15, 20, 25 or 30 year fixed interest rate loans, were not available to
purchase Smuggler homes. I I Conventional financing was also unavail-
able for refinancing and home improvement purposes. 1 2 The primary
lending option available to Smuggler residents consisted of portfolio
loans. These portfolio loans were short term in duration and carried
variable interests rates." 3 Standard practice for these portfolio loans
was to tie the interest rate to either the prime rate or the one year inter-
est rate for Treasury Bills, and attach an additional 3%.'14 This rate
was adjusted annually, and the loans were held and serviced "in-house"
by the originating bank." 5 Due to the short term duration and the in-
terest rate, however, most homeowners within the Site found the financ-
ing and repayment terms beyond their means. 1 6 Certainly, this was
true for owners of income restricted units.' 17 Free market units, if they
could be sold at all, generally were purchased for cash, with private fi-
nancing or by other non-conventional means.' 1 8
In addition to the reticence of the local lending community to lend
or underwrite loans for properties on the Smuggler Site, Fannie Mae
suspended its agreement "to purchase 30 year fixed rate mortgages
from authorized lenders who originate mortgages ... on properties de-
veloped by the Aspen/Pitkin [County] Housing Authority"' ' 9 in late
1990.120 Fannie Mae halted its purchase of these loans based on a fail-
ure to comply with the warranty and disclosure requirements of its
Mortgage Selling and Servicing Contract and its Selling Guide. 12 1 Sec-
tion 303 of the Selling Guide requires the lender to disclose information
to an appraiser that an environmental hazard exists "in or on the prop-
erty or in the vicinity of the property."' 122 The appraiser must then
109, See Michael Bourne, Local Bankers Say Smuggler Loans Too Risky, ASPEN DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 13, 1990, at 1.
110. See Terri Barteistein, Some Smuggler Financing Is Available Despite Fears About Lead
Contamination, ASPEN TIMES DAILY, Dec. 23, 1991, at 12.





116. See Barteistein, supra note 110.
117. Id.
118. See Chappell, supra note 73.
119. Letter from Suzanne Parker, Senior Investment Officer, Low- and Moderate-In-
come Housing, Fannie Mae, to James Adamsky, Director, Aspen/Pitkin County Housing
Authority 1 (uly 27, 1990) (on file with the author). This letter documents Fannie Mae's
commitment the mortgages.
120. Letter from Judith Dedmon, Senior Vice President, Fannie Mae Southwestern Re-
gional Office, to Harry Truscott, Acting Executive Director, Aspen/Pitkin County Housing
Authority 2 (Mar. 22, 1991) (on file with the author). Although the rejection of loans be-
gan in November 1990, the agreement was formally suspended in this letter.
121. Id. at 1-2.
122. Fannie Mae, supra note 38, at 728.
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"note the hazardous condition on the appraisal report and comment on
any influence that the hazard may have on the property's value and mar-
ketability.., and make appropriate adjustments in the overall analysis of
the property's value."' 123 The lenders' inability to quantify the costs and
effect of EPA's remediation activities, including institutional controls, on
property values coupled with EPA's reluctance to provide assurances
that lenders would not be jointly and severally liable for cleanup costs
prompted Fannie Mae to reach this decision.
124
III. EPA RESPONSES TO ALLEVIATE LENDING COMMUNITY WORRIES
On both a local and national scale, EPA endeavored to convince
residents and lenders that it would not seek its response costs from resi-
dents and lenders despite the fact that they are liable under the law.
Preliminary attempts by local EPA officials to explain EPA's enforce-
ment practices,' 2 5 while they appeared to be appreciated by the Aspen
community, did little to allay the residents and lenders' fears that they
would be the subject of a cost recovery action. In response to the con-
tinuing reluctance of local lenders to approve mortgages, EPA, the De-
partment ofJustice, and counsel for the local citizens caucus, developed
the first-ever Citizens Consent Decree.126 This decree, however, did not
meet with widespread acceptance; in fact, less than 50% of the residents
of the Site signed it. 1 2 7 In response to the growing national concern
over residential landowner and lender liability, EPA drafted an enforce-
ment policy followed by a rulemaking. These responses and their rela-
tive success in addressing the residents and lenders' concerns are
discussed below.
CITIZENS CONSENT DECREE
In April, 1991, after eighteen months of internal discussions and
external negotiation, EPA offered the residents of the Smuggler Moun-
tain Site a consent decree to settle any of their potential liabilities. This
consent decree was not only unprecedented but somewhat superfluous
since EPA had publicly stated it would not seek its response costs from
residential homeowners at the Site. The citizens, however, insisted on
the legal protection the consent decree would offer not only from the
United States (in case it changed its mind) but from third parties, who
might seek the response costs they paid pursuant to a settlement or in
the event the United States prevailed on the merits in the cost recovery
lawsuit. Except for one provision, the terms of the citizens consent de-
123. Id.
124. Letter from Judith Dedmon, supra note 48, at 2.
125. Discussions between EPA Region VIII Regional Administrator James J. Scherer
and Hazardous Waste Management Division Director Robert L. Duprey and top Pitkin
County officials and local bankers were held on May 18, 1990.
126. A copy of this proposed consent decree can be obtained from EPA's Smuggler
Mountain Site file, EPA Superfund Records Center, 999 18th Street, Denver, Colorado
80202. This decree was offered to all Site residents on April 10, 1991.
127. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 70:3
SUPERFUND SITE DESIGNATION
cree were unremarkable. The decree required that the Smuggler resi-
dents: 1) refrain from exacerbating the contamination that existed on
their property; 128 2) grant the Untied States access for performance of
the remedial action and subsequent periodic reviews; 12 9 and 3) comply
with local land use restrictions (institutional controls). 130 These con-
trols had been developed cooperatively between EPA and the local gov-
ernments and were designed to ensure the continued effectiveness and
protectiveness of the remedy. The decree allowed future additions or
developments of Smuggler properties without Superfund liability pro-
vided the excavation and construction activities complied with institu-
tional controls.' 3 1 Residents were also required to file a Notice of
Record in the chain of title for the property that indicated the property
was situated within the boundaries of the Smuggler Mountain
Superfund Site. '
3 2
Because the consent decree was premised on the residential use of
the property, a unique provision was crafted so that the United States
could revive its claim for response costs should a subsequent purchaser
use the property for commercial purposes.' 3 3 This provision compels
the settling defendant property owner to notify EPA of any intended
real estate transaction and whether the prospective purchaser "intends
to use the property for Residential Use or Commercial Use."' 3 4 If the
intended use is commercial, the property owner must also disclose the
purchase price,' 3 5 to guard against any collusion between the parties or
any "unjust enrichment" of the seller. Unjust enrichment could occur if
the purchaser states that the use of the property will remain residential,
waits for EPA to remediate the property and then develops the property
commercially. EPA having spent monies out of the Superfund and will
then have to incur additional costs to recoup these funds from the new
purchaser/developer. To guard against any potential misrepresenta-
tions, EPA provided that the covenants not to sue the settling defendant
could be voided and the response costs recovered if the property's use
was impermissibly converted. ' 3 6
In consideration for the performance of these obligations by the
settling defendants, the United States covenanted not to sue the current
residential homeowners for present and future liability.' 3 7 Simply put,
the United States would refrain from seeking its response costs for im-
plementing the remedy selected in the original ROD (and ESDs that
modified it) or for any future remedy, should the remedy be changed or
prove to be ineffective. The settling defendants also were given protec-
128. Id. at 12.
129. Id. at 11.
130. Id. at 12.
131. Id. at 12-13.
132. Id. at 13.
133. Id. at 16.
134. Id. at 14.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 16.
137. Id. at 18-19.
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tion against claims by third parties in contribution actions, to the extent
provided by Section 113 of CERCLA. 13 8 These covenants not to sue,
however, did not run with the land and future landowners would not be
protected from suit by EPA or any third parties unless they also entered
into the consent decree with the United States.' 39 Without these pro-
tections running to future landowners, the decree received a lukewarm
reception by both the residents and the banking community. As a result,
less than 50% of the Site residents actually executed the agreement. 140
POLICY TOWARD OWNERS OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY AT SUPERFUND
SITES
Concurrent with the finalization of the citizens' Consent Decree,
EPA began working on a national policy to address the potential liabili-
ties of residential landowners at Superfund sites. The lending contro-
versy at Smuggler played a major role in the development of this policy,
as did the financial difficulties of residents near the Tucson Airport
Superfund Site in EPA Region IX. There, the migration of a plume of
contaminants in the groundwater created an environmental hazard that
caused the local bankers to curtail the approval of mortgages. 14 1 Based
on these examples, EPA determined that a policy that provided a uni-
form approach to residential landowners was essential.
142
The Policy Towards Owners of Residential Property at Superfund Sites 143 is
an exercise of the Agency's enforcement discretion and applies to any
owner of residential property located on a Superfund site, regardless of
whether the owner purchased the property with the knowledge that it
was contaminated. 144 "Residential property" is defined as "single fam-
ily residences of one-to-four dwelling units, including accessory land,
buildings or improvements incidental to such dwellings which are exclu-
sively for residential use."'14 5 The policy also applies to persons with
138. Id. at 21 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613). The effect of this provision has been the sub-
ject of many recent court decisions. See, e.g., Dravo Corp. v. Zuber, 804 F. Supp. 1182, 1187-
88 (D. Neb. 1992)(holding plaintiff suing for contribution under CERCLA not allowed to
engage in discovery regarding defendant's de minimis settlement with EPA); Azko Coatings,
Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 803 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (N.D.Ind. 1992)(holding settling potentially
responsible parties not liable to non-settling potentially responsible parties for contribu-
tion under state law); Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079, 1087
(D.N.J. 1992)(explaining that section 113(f(2) protects settling defendants from claims for
contributions by non-settling defendants).
139. Proposed Consent Decree, supra note 126, at 20, 21.
140. Michael Bourne, EPA Consent Decrees: Lack of Signatures And Residents' Snafus Spell
Trouble, High Country Real Estate, Week of June 26 -July 2, 1991, at 12.
141. Letter from Susan T. Smith, Director, Loan Acquisition for the Southwestern Re-
gional Office, Fannie Mae, to William H. Rivoir, III, Superintendent of Banks, Arizona
State Banking Department (April 11, 1991) and Letter from Michael Schwartz, Legislative
Director, Federal Relations, Government and Industry Relations, Freddie Mac, to William
H. Rivoir, III (May 8, 1991).
142. Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency,
Policy Toward Owners of Residential Property at Superfund Sites, OSWER Directive
#9834.6 (July 3, 1991).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 5.
145. Id. at 3.
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interests in residential properties, such as lessees and tenants, provided
they comply with the other requirements of the policy.1
46
The residential landowner policy distinguishes the instances when
EPA will seek its response costs from residential homeowners from
those instances when EPA will forego such action. It states that EPA
"would contemplate" an action to recover its response costs or order a
landowner to undertake response actions if the property owner's activi-
ties lead "to a release or threat of release of a hazardous substance"1
4 7
or if the owner "develops or improves the property in a manner incon-
sistent with residential use."1 4 8 EPA may also demand access to the res-
idential property to gather information or investigate site conditions to
assess the need for a response action.14 9 Lastly, residential landowners
may lose the protection of this policy if they fail to comply with institu-
tional controls.'
50
Although this guidance officially stated EPA's position on the exer-
cise of its enforcement authority vis-a-vis residential landowners at
Superfund sites, the policy had no binding effect on third parties. The
policy is neither a rulemaking nor an interpretation of any provision of
the Superfund law.151 As such, the residents' concerns about third party
contribution claims had not been resolved. Banks and public lenders
continued to be reluctant to approve mortgages on Smuggler properties
notwithstanding the policy's application to "persons who acquire resi-
dential property through purchase, foreclosure, gift, inheritance or other
form of acquisition, as long as those persons' activities after acquisition
are consistent with this policy."
' 152
LENDER LIABILITY RULE
The obstacles to initiating and approving Smuggler mortgages were
finally eliminated with the issuance of EPA's Lender Liability Rule on
April 29, 1992.153 This rulemaking interprets the "security interest"
exemption found in CERCLA section 101 (20) (A) 154 to exclude certain
persons from liability as owners or operators under section 107(a) of
CERCLA.15 5 A person who maintains indicia of ownership in a facility
primarily to protect a security interest will not be considered a liable
party, as long as that person does not participate in the management of
the facility. 1
56
The rule also defines key statutory terms. "Indicia of ownership"
146. Id. at 4.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 6.
152. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
153. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Lia-
bility Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,343 (1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1992)).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1990).
155. Id. § 9607(a).
156. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1992).
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includes evidence of any security interest, such as holding title to real or
personal property to secure a loan or other obligation.' 5 7 Examples of
such interests include mortgages, deeds of trust, surety bonds, guaran-
tees of obligations and titles held pursuant to foreclosure and their
equivalents.15 8 The phrase "primarily to protect a security interest"
means that the person holds the indicia of ownership primarily to ensure
the payment or performance of an obligation.' 5 9 The security interest
may not be held for investment or speculation purposes. 160
Once it is established that the person holds these ownership inter-
ests to protect a security interest, it must be determined whether the
person has "participated in the management" of a facility from which
there is release or threat of release of a hazardous substance or is cur-
rently doing so. Participation in management of the facility would void
the exemption from the CERCLA section 107(a) liability of owners or
operators.' 6 ' A two prong test exists to determine if a person partici-
pates in the management of a facility: (1) the holder of a security inter-
est exercises control over the borrower's environmental compliance,
such as waste disposal or handling practices; 162 or (2) the holder of a
security interest exercises control over the borrower's enterprise, in-
cluding day-to-day environmental compliance decision making, or all, or
substantially all, of the operational aspects of the enterprise other than
environmental compliance.163 The second prong does not include situ-
ations where the person exercises only administrative or financial con-
trol over the operation of the facility. 164 Thus, the rule establishes a
cause and effect relationship; if the secured creditor's involvement
causes any change in the operations at the subject facility, that activity
will void the exemption to the definition of owner or operator found in
section 101 (20) (A) of CERCLA. 1
65
This general standard has been criticized as being vague and impre-
cise for discriminating between acceptable and prohibited conduct.
166
Nevertheless, a lender can engage in a number of activities in the normal
course of business without incurring Superfund liability. For example,
the security interest holder can undertake "loan workout" activities
"such as restructuring or renegotiating the terms of the obligation, re-
quiring payment of additional interest, extending the payment period,
exercising forbearance, or providing advice or taking other workout ac-
tions' 167 without legal repercussions. The rule further provides for
lenders that foreclose on the contaminated property to recover their se-
157. Id. § 300.1100(a).
158. Id.
159. Id. § 300.1100(b).
160. Id. § 300.1100(b)(2).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).
162. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(I)(i).
163. Id. § 300.1 100(c)(1)(ii)(A).
164. Id. § 300.1100(c)(1)(ii)(B).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
166. See generally 57 Fed. Reg. 18,357-58 (1992).
167. Id. at 18,347.
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curity interest.168 Foreclosure can be accomplished without risk of be-
ing considered an owner or operator pursuant to Section 107(a) of
CERCLA, 169 so long as the other requirements of the rule are met. Ac-
tivities incident to the foreclosure are also afforded the rule's protec-
tions, such as winding up operations and liquidating assets.17
0
Besides participating in the management of the facility, the exemp-
tion from CERCLA liability will be voided if the secured creditor fails to
offer the subject property for sale in a "reasonably expeditious man-
ner," 17 1 or if the secured creditor "outbids, rejects or fails to act upon
* . . a written bona fide, firm offer of fair consideration for the prop-
erty.' 1 7 2 The term reasonably expeditious manner is defined as
"whatever commercially reasonable means are available or appropriate,
[to the lender for disposing of the property] taking all facts and circum-
stances into account."173 In the alternative, the rule provides a "bright-
line" test 174 against which lenders can determine if their post-foreclo-
sure conduct would void the exemption. According to this test, within
twelve months the lenders must list the property with a broker, dealer or
agent who deals in selling this type of facility, or the lender must adver-
tise its sale in a trade or other publication or newspaper of general circu-
lation in the geographic area where the facility is located on a monthly
basis.' 7 5 The rule further provides that the lender must act on a bona
fide offer to purchase the property within 90 days of the receipt of the
offer. 17 6 The lender may reject or outbid this offer without recrimina-
tion if it is for less than the full fair market value of the facility, particu-
larly if the lender's fiduciary duty requires it to do so. 177 Nonetheless,
the lender is not protected post-foreclosure if its conduct forms an in-
dependent basis of liability under section 107(a)(3) or 107 (a)(4) of
CERCLA. 1
78
In light of the lending difficulties experienced in Aspen, it is impor-
tant to note that EPA's lender liability rule applies to all governmental
entities-federal, state and local-that acquire property "involuntarily,"
as a result of their statutory or regulatory mandates.179 Governmental
entities include governmental agencies or quasi-governmental corpora-
tions or orgnizations that acquire facilities pursuant to their actions as
conservators, receivers, or loan guarantors, or through seizure, forfei-
ture, abandonment, tax delinquency or escheat.1 80 The rule also ap-
plies to governmental entities that hold indicia of ownership in
168. Id.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
170. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,347.
171. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(d)(1).
172. Id. § 300.1 100(d)(2)(ii)(B).
173. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,378.
174. See id.
175. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(2)(i).
176. Id. § 300.1 10(d)(2)(ii)(B).
177. Id. § 300.1100(d)(2)(ii).
178. Id. § 300.1100(d)(3).
179. See id. § 300.1105.
180. See 57 Fed. Reg. 18,380-82, 18,385.
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Superfund facilities to maintain their security interests. 181
IV. LENDER RESPONSES
PRE LENDER LIABILITY RULE
Although these Agency pronouncements definitively stated how
EPA intended to exercise its enforcement discretion against lenders (i.e.,
title owners who foreclose on Superfund properties to maintain their
security interest) and residential property owners, it took some time
before federal and local lenders responded favorably to EPA's new rule
and policy directions. In the case of the Smuggler Site, both the interim
rule and the issuance of the residential landowner policy had little or no
effect on easing the credit crunch felt by Aspen residents. The lending
community, including Fannie Mae, did not substantially change its prac-
tice against originating or refinancing loans until approximately four
months after the lender rule became final on April 29, 1992.182 The
responses of these entities in the interim period (between July 1991 and
the finalization of the rule), however, document the anxiety that per-
vaded the lending community and offers some suggestions beyond the
lender liability rule to address these fears.
Fannie Mae's apprehensions, then as now, focused on its inability to
recoup its investment, due both to any potential Superfund liability and
any diminished property value. 183 Fannie Mae accepted EPA's assess-
ment of the risk that lead contaminated soil poses to the public living
within the Site boundaries and stated that it believed that this risk would
be eliminated upon completion of EPA's proposed remediation.
184
Since this risk continued until the Site cleanup was finished, Fannie Mae
was concerned that it could be the subject of actions for rescission of
real estate sales contracts, as well as actions for personal injury (i.e.,
toxic torts) and property damage.'
8 5
Fannie Mae was also concerned that the risk would not be perma-
nently eliminated or removed from the Site. It recognized that EPA's
selected remedy could, even after successful implementation, fail to ad-
dress the environmental hazard. Remedy failure in turn could force
EPA to incur additional cleanup costs, which might be passed on to fu-
ture landowners. 18 6 Although Fannie Mae deferred to EPA's judgment
regarding the best way to cleanup the Site, concern remained that insti-
tutional controls would not insure that the remedy remained effective.
Furthermore, even if they worked, institutional controls would encum-
181. See 57 Fed. Reg. 18,369.
182. Letter from James A. Johnson, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Of-
ficer, Fannie Mae, to The Honorable Timothy Wirth, United States Senator for the State of
Colorado (July 31, 1992) (on file with the author).
183. See Letter from Addison Terry, Jr, Vice President and Counsel for the Southwest
Regional Office, Fannie Mae, to Nancy N. [sic] Mangone, Assistant Regional Counsel for
Region VIII, USEPA (Aug. 1, 1991)(on file with the author).
184. Id. at 2.
185. Id. at 2-3.
186. Id. at 3.
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ber the land in perpetuity. 18 7 The possibility of cost recovery actions
and the encumbrances that would run with the land would make the
purchase of Smuggler property less attractive to prospective purchasers
than properties outside the Site. 188 Lastly, Fannie Mae was also dis-
tressed that EPA might look to it to disgorge any windfall profits created
when the property's value increased after EPA's cleanup activities were
concluded. Fannie Mae argued that it would be difficult to "sort out
which.., factors cause an increase in the value of residential property at
a Superfund site," 189 but insisted that it alone should "take advantage of
any gain that might occur from foreclosure and resale property in [the
Smuggler] site." 19 0 As reflected in the lender liability final rule, EPA
did not agree.' 9 '
Before EPA's lender liability rule became final Fannie Mae pressed
for "written assurances that EPA will not bring an action against Fannie
Mae"' 1 2 for the activities of pre-foreclosure residential owners giving
rise to Superfund liability. It also sought assurances that it would not be
considered liable as an owner post-foreclosure. Specifically, Fannie Mae
requested that EPA provide it a covenant not to sue for any prior resi-
dential owner incurred liabilities, in addition to protection for "Fannie
Mae's exposure to continuing liability due to noncompliance with the
proposed deed restrictions"19 3 (i.e., institutional controls). Since EPA
had no legal basis for entering into a consent decree with a possible
future owner, particularly when such ownership was highly unlikely,
19 4
this covenant not to sue was not provided to Fannie Mae. While the
local banks did not insist on this kind of written assurance, they took
their lead from Fannie Mae and their lending practices did not change.
POST LENDER LIABILITY RULE
With the issuance of EPA's final lender liability rule, 19 5 the logjam
in getting Smuggler mortgages approved finally appeared to be broken.
On July 31, 1992, the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Of-
ficer James A. Johnson wrote to Senator Tim Wirth to document Fannie
Mae's decision that "[a]lthough we have continuing reservations about
the effectiveness of the EPA [lender liability] rule, in the Smuggler
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 4.
190. Id.
191. See 57 Fed. Reg. 18,368.
192. Letter from Addison Terry, Jr. to Nancy N. [sic] Mangone, supra note 183, at 5.
193. Id.
194. The possibility that Fannie Mae would acquire these properties post-foreclosure
was made highly unlikely due to the terms of its 1990 agreement with the Aspen/Pitkin
Housing Authority to purchase loans on the income restricted units. This agreement pro-
vided that the City and County had the right of first refusal to purchase any loans in ar-
rears and that Fannie Mae could sell the unit on the open market without income
restriction if the loan was in default. According to Mary Murphy of the Aspen/Pitkin
Housing Authority, this option was never exercised by the City or the County nor were any
Smuggler loans ever in default.
195. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,343.
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Mountain Site case, we have concluded our risk is minimal." 1 9 6 A fol-
low-up letter from Suzanne Parker, 19 7 of Fannie Mae's Southwest Re-
gional Office, indicated how Fannie Mae intended to re-initiate its
lending program. Fannie Mae agreed to buy loans originated for Smug-
gler properties "for a twelve (12) month period beginning July 1, 1992
and ending July 31, 1993, or upon the purchase of loans in the aggre-
gate volume of $10,000,000.00, whichever comes first."198 These loans
could take the form of 15, 20, 25 or 30 year fixed mortgages, but they
would only be purchased for the restricted housing units within the
Smuggler Site. 199
Fannie Mae attached a number of other pre-conditions to purchas-
ing these Smuggler loans. For example, in addition to the owner/occu-
pied restriction, Fannie Mae required the loans to conform to all
requirements of its Selling Guide and prohibited purchase of units with
deed restrictions other than those income restrictions imposed by the
Housing Authority. 20 0 These conditions, therefore, require appraisers
and lenders to disclose the environmental hazards, but prohibit loan
purchases if the institutional controls deed restrictions are enacted.
2 0 '
These conditions create an inherent contradiction: the only way the
remedy is effective and the environmental and economic risks are less-
ened is if the deed restrictions are enacted; the only way the loans can be
purchased is if the environmental deed restrictions are rejected.
The other major pre-condition to purchasing these loans is that a
bank interested in participating in this program provide a cash commit-
ment or amend "its existing fixed rate special pool purchase" to secure
these loans. 20 2 As of the date of this article, only a handful of local
banks had sought to enter into these additional commitments. The lim-
ited number of banks seeking to participate in the Fannie Mae loan pro-
gram, however, may be due more to their general disinterest in securing
mortgages for Smuggler properties rather than any hardship in meeting
these financing standards. Thatcher Bank, for example, has secured a
commitment from Fannie Mae of up to $5 million in Smuggler loans.
20 3
This leaves $5 million collectively for the rest of the local bankers that
may be interested in participating in the low-to moderate-income Fannie
Mae program.
20 4
Regardless of their participation in the Fannie Mae income re-
stricted loan program, a few of the local banks have begun to originate
mortgages on Smuggler properties themselves. These mortgages are
196. See Johnson, supra note 182.
197. Letter from Suzanne Parker, Senior Investment Officer for Low- and Moderate-
Income Housing Programs, Southwest Regional Office, Fannie Mae, to Tom Baker, Direc-
tor, Aspen/Pitkin Housing Authority (Aug. 24, 1992)(on file with the author).
198. Id. at 1.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. and Letter from Addison Terry to Nancy N.[sic] Mangone, supra note 183.
202. Id. at 1.




either self-financed or sold to local or regional mortgage brokers. 20 5
These banks, as does Fannie Mae, persist in requiring disclosure of the
EPA-identified environmental hazard in an appraisal report or other
"acknowledgement. ' °2 0 6 But, these banks have changed their lending
practices, at least as applied to the income restricted units.20 7 Gone are
the days when higher interest portfolio loans were the only lending op-
tion for income restricted Smuggler properties. Since August of 1992,
these mortgages have become as competitive as other fixed rate, con-
ventional loans.20 8 Unfortunately, according to representatives of both
the Housing Authority and a number of local mortgage brokers, the fi-
nancing problems on "free market" units still exist.20 9 Local lenders
and regional brokers continue to decline to originate or buy "private"
unit mortgages on the secondary markets.2 10 The reticence of local
banks to originate mortgages on private homes or condominium units
may be due to the exclusion of these residences from Fannie Mae's letter
agreement. Private homes and condominiums at the Site, if they can be
sold at all, continue to be the subject of non-conventional financing, pri-
vate financing or are sold for cash.
2 1
A recent development, however, may change the lending practices
of the local banks toward these "free market" units. A March 23, 1993,
letter from Larry W. Bowen, Vice President for Quality Control/Opera-
tions of Fannie Mae's Southwest Regional Office, clarified that Fannie
Mae's intent was to accept loans on any properties within the Smuggler
Mountain Site. This decision to accept all qualifying Smuggler loans
was reached after EPA's publication of the lender liability rule and as
well as EPA's success in reaching agreement with various parties in the
United States v. Smuggler-Durant Mining Corporation litigation. Mortgages
for both employee restricted and free market can now be sold by local
lenders to Fannie Mae provided the lenders comply with Fannie Mae's
Selling and Servicing Guides, execute a Disclosure statement and meet
other previously-enumerated terms and conditions.
2 12
V. CONCLUSION
Statistics demonstrate the high demand for "low cost" employee
housing within Aspen, regardless of its location within or without the
Smuggler Mountain Site. Nevertheless, the designation of an area as a
"Superfund Site" by listing on the NPL decreases its desirability as a
place to live for both environmental and economic reasons. Residents
205. Id. and see Cooper, supra note 72.
206. See Cooper, supra note 72.
207. See Chappell, supra, note 73.
208. Id.
209. Interview with Mary Murphy, Aspen/Pitkin County Housing Authority, in Aspen,
Colo. (Dec. 1, 1992); Interview with Dorothy Winagle, Smuggler Citizens' Caucus, in
Aspen, Colo. (October 27, 1992).
210. Id.
211. Id.; Chappell, supra note 73.
212. See, Form Letter from Larry W. Bowen, Vice President for Quality Control/Oper-
ations, Southwest Regional Office, Fannie Mae, dated March 23, 1993.
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may not want to risk their personal health and banks may not want to
risk their economic well-being on mortgage loans that may expose them
to Superfund liability if they take title to the collateral securing these
loans. There is no easy solution or quick fix to these environmental and
economic risks. Salt Lake County lowered property values in an attempt
to ease the individual landowners credit crunch, but may have created a
new one for the City of Midvale and indirectly, the constituents it serves.
Leadville and other former mining towns were hoping to infuse capital
and increase property values in their communities by instituting limited
stakes gambling, but it appears gambling will not come to these areas
any time soon.
Instead, Fannie Mae suggested that the best approach for restoring
property value of a community affected by a Superfund designation is to
clean up the contamination and move the site toward deletion from
NPL. Of course, depending on the nature and extent of the cleanup
required for the site, this process could take years or even decades. It is
important to note, however, that in the interim period before the site is
deleted, the administrative process employed by EPA to undertake site
remediation offers some comfort for resident landowners and banks
alike. For example, EPA can certify that the remedial action has been
completed in accordance with the ROD and has become "operational
and functional" in addressing the environmental risk. A determination
that the remedy is complete, at least for an operable unit or some sub-
unit, can also be issued. Thus, EPA can notify each individual land-
owner when his property has been "cleaned" and this notification can be
put in the chain of title. Any lender reviewing an application for the
mortgage of the subject property then would take it with the knowledge
that the property is "clean." This may allow the lender or new owner to
invoke the protections of the "innocent landowner" guidance previously
discussed.
The 1990 National Contingency Plan ("NCP") 2 13 also revised the
regulations dealing with the listing and deleting of sites on the NPL and
created a new "Construction Completion" category for Superfund sites
either awaiting deletion, in the CERCLA section 121(c) "five-year" re-
view phase, or undergoing long-term remedial actions.2 14 A site can be
placed in the "Construction Completion" portion of NPL once EPA de-
termines that the construction of the remedy is complete at the entire
site and that it is achieving the protectiveness or cleanup standards se-
lected in the ROD or RODs for the Site. EPA makes this determination
by issuing a document called a "Close Out Report." However, the
Close Out Report will only be issued following the completion of the
remedy at the final operable unit for the site. Five-year or periodic re-
views will nonetheless be conducted to ensure that the remedy remains
protective and that operation and maintenance activities are effective
even after the Close Out Report is issued. The process of deleting a site
213. 40 C.F.R. § 300, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666 (Mar. 8, 1990).
214. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8699 (1990).
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from the NPL can be initiated after performance of the first periodic
review. The first periodic review may occur within five years of the initi-
ation of the remedial action.
For the Smuggler Site, despite all its years of controversy, the worst
of the credit crunch may be over. However, the public and lending com-
munity perception that the properties are "tainted" because of the envi-
ronmental and economic risk will not be easily erased. For this to
happen the human health and environmental risk has to be eliminated
either as the result of a completed cleanup or with a new assessment that
shows that no risk exists. With EPA's existing legislative mandate and
its conviction that high levels of lead contamination in soils pose a
human health and/or environmental risk, it is foolhardy to expect a "no
risk" risk assessment is in the offing.
It is crucial, therefore, for EPA to continue to support its existing
lender liability rule and the "residential landowner" policy and for EPA
and the community to be diligent in keeping lenders informed of the
economic risk, albeit relatively minor, posed by the Smuggler Site. Fur-
ther, EPA can also endeavor to educate lenders on how to minimize that
risk even further. One way may be to quantify the risk for each property.
Homeowners can include environmental testing data in their mortgage
application packages to show the lender the true extent of contamina-
tion on their property. In most cases, the testing can show the few "hot
spots" that need to be remediated, and may go so far as estimating a
cleanup cost. Discussions with national and local lenders have focused
on a fear of the unknown; providing the lenders with a dollar amount of
the property's potential cleanup cost may do more to allay this amor-
phous fear than any other action.
EPA, however, cannot educate lenders alone. There needs to be
more concerted efforts, like those undertaken at the Smuggler Site, to
make lenders smarter. Local community groups and even Congres-
sional intervention should be pursued so that economic risks associated
with an NPL listing and cleanup action can be completely understood,
and in appropriate cases like Smuggler, eliminated.
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